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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
KEITH NORTH, by and through his
Guardian Ad Litem, C. E. NORTH,
Plainti.ff and Appellant,

~

I

\ Case No. 7457

vs.
C. H. CARTWRIGHT,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

'

'I
\

NATURE OF THE CASE
This suit was brought by the appellant Keith North, by
and through his guardian ad litem, C. E. North, against the
Respondent, C. H. Cartwright, to recover damages for personal
injuries sustained by the appellant as the result of the respondent's driving an automobile against the appellant and the
motor scooter he, with another person: was operating the
collision occurring on First South Street immediately west of
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the intersection of Regent Street. At the close of the trial the
court directed a verdict of no cause of action, and this. appeal
was taken.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant in ·his brief has asserted that this case does
not involve an intersection accident. We submit to the court
at the outset that the actual collision occurred at a point
twenty-one ( 21) feet west on First South Street from the west
curb line of Regent Street (R. 108), yet it is our position that
this fact notwithstanding, the rights, duties, and liabilities of
the parties arise out of their relative positions at the intersection of First South Street and Regent Street. At said place
in the center of First South Street the center lines were broken
to the west of Regent Street so that an automobile turning
west could take a northwest direction from Regent Street
entering First South Street, Regent Street being a narrow street.
At the time defendant was well within his traffic lane and
would have crossed the center of First South east of where
the line was broken and in his proper traffic position. Appellant, a boy of seventeen ( 17), was operating a small
motor scooter commonly known as a "doodle bug" (Exhibit A) in a westerly direction on First South Street at a
speed of about ten miles per hour (R. 46). Seated behind
him on the scooter was Robert Cox, age' fourteen ( 14) (R.
33-34). Respondent was operating a Chrysler sedan motor
vehicle in a northerly direction on Regent Street. Respondent
stopped at a stop sign on Regent Street and First South Street
( R. -51) and after having look twice to the left and once to
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the right to observe aproaching traffic, he proceeded slowly
and cautiously (R. 145) out into the intersection at a speed
of between five and eight miles per hour in order to make a
left tum down First South Street (R. 1 'S..!) When respondent
had reached a point twenty-one ( 21) feet west of the west
curb line of Regent Street and approximately four ( 4) feet
south of the center line of First South Street he collided with
appellant.
Appellant contends in his statement of facts that at the
time the parties were in the positions outlined above, traffic
on First South was heavy, however, the testimony at the trial
below indicated that the only traffic upon said street was a Salt
Lake City Lines bus proceeding west on First South Street
(R. 154).

,
(

~,
I

I

Appellant in his brief contends that the appellant was
driving his vehicle close to the center of the white middle line
on First South Street and on the north side of said center line
(R. 92) . Yet the testimony offered and received at the trial
below abundantly showed that at the point of impact appellant's
position was approximately four ( 4) feet south of the center
line of said street (R. 127, R. 108). Further, the testimony
below showed that only a second or so before_ the impact occurred the Cox boy, who was the first to observe the respondent,
shouted to the appellant, "look out, Keith," whereupon he
jumped off the vehicle (R. 35). At this time the appellant's
motor scooter was traveling straight forward in a westerly
direction (R. 45). The collision followed instantaneously
after the Cox boy jumped off the appellant's vehicle (R. 35).
l~ppellant testified in an attempt to explain his position on the
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south side of the center line at the point of impact that when
Cox jumped off his scooter his movement in leaving the
vehicle caused it to be "pushed a little" (R. 40) and that
thereafter sufficient time elapsed to enable his vehicle to travel
across the center line at an angle to the point of impact (R. 93).
Prior to the impact the appellant got a fleeting glimpse of the
respondent through his rear view mirror (R. 59).
After the impact the respondent's vehicle stopped instantaneously of its own accord (R. 165), whereupon, the Cox
boy shouted to the respondent to "back up" (R. 155). Respondent backed his vehicle approximately three to four feet
(R. 155) dragging appellant and his vehicle which had somehow become engaged with the front bumper of respondent's
car.
The right front bumper of respondent's car contacted
the motor scooter (R. 41) on the left rear side (R. 35, 56).
There were gouge marks indicating where the scooter had been
dragged by the backing operation, which marks were loc_ated
twenty-one ( 21) feet west of the west side of Regent Street
and eight (8) feet south of the double line (R. 108). The
extent and nature of appellant's injuries are not material here.
It was stipulated at the trial that the following ordinance
of Salt Lake City was in full force and effect. Section 6128
(c) 3, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1944:
"The driver of a vehicle shall like,~.rise stop in obedience to a stop sign as required herein at an intersection
where a stop sign is erected at one or more entrances
thereto although not a part of a through highway and
shall proceed cautiously, yielding to vehicles not so
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obligated to stop which are within the intersection or
are approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate
hazard, but may then proceed."
In summary, it is clear that the appellant was traveling
on the south side of the center line of First South Street in
a straight southwesterly course. The respondent came slowly
and cautiously out into the intersection, and while the respondent was executing a left turn a collision occurred between the
vehicles.

STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH APPELLANT
RELIES.
Point I. The respondent's negligence was clear and undisputed.
Point II. The appellant was not contributorily negligent
as a matter of law.

ARGUMENT
Point I. The respondent's negligence was clear and undisputed.
No argument submitted.
Point II. The appellant was contributorily negligent as
a matter of law.
We subq1it to the court that the evidence abupdantly shows
that the appellant was guilty of contributory negligence, that
7
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the negligent acts and omissions of the appellant were the
proximate cause of the collision, and that the cumulative
weight of the testimony justified the trial court in holding as
a matter of law that the appellant's own negligence barred
his recovery.
The conclusion must surely follow from the facts established at the trial that the appellant's motor vehicle was being
driven at least four ( 4) feet south of the center line of the
street. First, the impact occurred at this point. Second, by
appellant's own admission, and that ?f his passenger, Cox, the
vehicle was traveling in a straight westerly direction at the
time Cox jumped off. He jumped only a split second before the
collision occurred. It appears impossible of belief by any
reasonable mind that the appellant's vehicle, while traveling
only ten miles per hour could have, with the space of a second,
crossed over the white center line of the street and traveled
four ( 4) feet south to the point of impact, if in fact the
appellant had been traveling on the north side of the street.
Respondent, after stopping for the stop sign on Regent
Street, looked twice to the left and once to the right before
proceeding out into the intersection. He observed an approaching Salt Lake City Lines bus and yielded to it) and he then
proceeded slowly and cautiously into the intersection after it
had passed. We submit that any reasonable view of the evid~nce indicates that respondent would have likewise yielded
to the appellant had the appellant been in a position where
respondent could reasonably be expected to observe him.
Having looked twice to the left and having observed no
traffic approaching from the south side of the line, and after
8
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yielding to traffic approaching from the right on the north
side of the line, it is unreasonable to require the respondent
to likewise search the south side of the street on respondent's
right to observe approaching traffic coming down the wrong
side of the street.
· Title 57, Chapter 7,'"Section 120 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1934 provides that:
"Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle
shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway."
In construing this statute the Supreme Court of Utah has
held in several cases, Staton vs. Western Macaroni Mfg. Co.,
174 Pac. 82 ~' being only one that:
"The strongest kind of a presumption of negligence
prevails against the party driving on the wrong side
of the road."
The explanation offered by the appellant as to his presence
on the south side of the line at the point of impact in no way
destroys the weight of this presumption. Rather, his conduct
in permitting the passenger Cox to ride the vehicle at all and in
permitting a chain of forces to be set in motion forcing ·the
vehicle over to the south side of the street when Cox jumped
off, assuming that these were the facts, constitutes further
negligence on hi~ part.
Section 57-7-169.11 and section 57-7-169.12 of Utah Session Laws of 1949 provide as follows:
"A person operating a motor vehicle or a motor
vehicle shall ride only upon the permanent and
regular seat attached thereto, and such operator shall

driv~n
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not carry any other person, nor shall any other person
ride on a motor vehicle unless such vehicle is designed
to carry more than one person."
"No person shall ride and no person driving a motor
vehicle shall knowingly permit any person to ride upon
any portion of any vehicle not designed or intended
for the use of passengers."
'X! e submit that the violation of any one or both of the
above statutes by the appellant constitutes further and additional negligence upon his part.

Appellant in his brief has called to the Court's attention
the recent case of Conklin vs. Walsh, 193 P. 2d 436, and the
recent case of Hickok vs. Skinner, 190 P. 2d 514, and has attempted to distinguish these cases and their holdings from the
case at bar. It is admitted that the factual situations presented
by these two cases differ somewhat from the case at bar, but
we submit to the Court that the fundamental governing rules
of law established by these cases apply likewise in this case.
In each of the above cited cases, this Court held that the
appellant, favored driver, was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law for failing to reappraise his position upou
the highway with respect to that of the disfavored driver and
to govern himself accordingly as a reasonable man. The
court in the Conklin case, supra, in holding that the appellant
was guilty of conributory negligence as a matter of law said:
"The duty to keep a proper lookout applies as well
to the favored as to the disfavored driver. Neither
driver can excuse his own failure to observe because th\:
other driver failed in his duty. Neither driver is at any
time to be excused for want of vigilance or failure to
10
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see what is plain to be seen. Drivers are permitted to
cross over arterial highways after having stopped. True,
they must yield the right-of-way to cars which are close
enough to constitute an immediate hazard This rule,
however, requires the exercise of some judgment. It
is still the duty on the part of the driver traveling the
arterial highway to remain reasonably alert to the
proximity of the disfavored driver starting across the
intersection in the belief that he can cross in safety.
The duty of keeping a proper lookout attends all those
operating motor vehicles and other ru.les of the road
do not relieve any driver of the necessity of complying
with this requirement."
In Hickok vs. Skinner, supra, this Court quoted with approval the case of Driefus vs. Levy, La., ~pp., 140 So. 259, 263,
and announced the governing rule of law to be that:
"The mere fact that the truck driver entered the
intersection first did not justify him in proceeding with-out caution and care, totally disregarding the oncoming
car which he had seen, and he could have easily dis~
covered by looking that whatever rights he had by
virtue of entering the intersection first were not going
to be respected by the other car. He should not have
advanced into the pathway of the other car, and by
doing so, was guilty of negligence." Huddy's Enc. of
Automobile law, (9th Ed.) Vol. 3-4, p. 278; Buckner
v. Powers, 125 So. 774.
We submit that in the case at bar we have an even stronger
application of the rules announced in the Conklin and Hickok
cases, for the reason that while in those cases the appellant
traveling at a fairly rapid rate of speed, maintained sufficient
lookout to observe the position of the disfavored driver at
some distance from the point of impact; in the case at bar, the
11
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appellant was traveling at a very slow rate of speed and yet
did not maintain sufficient lookout to observe the respondent
at the stop sign until the collision was unavoidable. The appellant's total failure . to maintain a proper lookout which
would enable him to observe the respondent and to govern his
movements in relation thereto, though he had more than ample
opportunity to do as brings him well within the purvue of the
Conklin and Hickok cases.

CONCLUSION
It is well settled that negligence as a matter of law exists
when the conduct of the party in question causes all reasonable
minds to conclude that said conduct has fallen below the
standard established by law to protect against unreasonable
risks of harm. This Court has announced the governing
standard of reasonable conduct as to the factual situation at
hand. We submit that the conduct of the appellant surely
causes all reasonable minds to conclude that the appellant was
negligent, and justified the trial court in holding that said
negligence was established as a matter of Ia:w barring his
recovery.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIELDS & SHIELDS
JOHN T. VERNIER

Attorneys for Respondent
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